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ABSTRACT 
Longitudinal Analysis of the Relationship of Existential Meaning  
with Depression and Hope. (August 2006) 
Nathan Mascaro, B.S., Louisiana State University;  
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. David H. Rosen 
                                                         Dr. Leslie C. Morey 
 
 
Although researchers are now able to assess reliably the variable of existential meaning, 
quality longitudinal investigations of meaning’s relationship with specific clinical variables are 
scarce. The author conceptualizes existential meaning as a composite of personal, spiritual, and 
implicit meaning. These latter three variables are, respectively, the experience of one’s particular 
life as having purpose and coherence, experiencing a transcendent or spiritual presence from 
which one derives a sense of unique purpose, and manifesting attitudes and behavior that are 
normatively valued. Utilizing a sample of 395 male and female undergraduates and employing 
the framework subscale of the Life Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R-framework), the Spiritual 
Meaning Scale (SMS), and the Personal Meaning Profile (PMP) to measure personal, spiritual, 
and implicit meaning, respectively, the author explored existential meaning’s relationship over 
time with depressive symptoms (as measured with the Beck Depression Inventory-II, depression 
scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, and depression scale of the Personality 
Assessment Inventory) and hope (as measured with the Herth Hope Scale, the Adult State Hope 
Scale, and the Beck Hopelessness Scale). A latent cross-lagged panel analysis of the relationship 
between meaning and depression over 2 one-month time periods indicated that meaning exerted 
unidirectional influence on depression, with decreases in meaning leading to increases in 
depressive symptoms. Additionally, hierarchical regression analysis showed that individuals 
 iv
with low levels of existential meaning were more likely than those with higher meaning levels to 
experience increased symptoms of depression in response to increased stress levels. Because the 
newly developed SMS (appended to this paper) was the only meaning measure exhibiting 
sufficient discriminant validity with regard to hope, only the SMS was entered in cross-lagged 
panel analysis measuring its relationship to hope over the 2 one-month periods of time, with 
results indicating that spiritual meaning and hope reciprocally influence one another. Existential 
meaning seems appropriately conceptualized as a construct consisting of personal, spiritual, and 
implicit components. Because this construct can be assessed reliably and may play a role in the 
etiology and alleviation of depressive symptoms, the author calls for increased research within 
clinical settings on methods for optimizing individuals’ levels of existential meaning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Brief History of the Scientific Study of Existential Meaning 
The Existential Position. The notion that perceived meaning in life, or existential 
meaning, is an important factor in promoting well-being has been with us at least implicitly since 
the beginning of human thought. As evinced by the ubiquity of religion and metaphysical as well 
as ethical philosophy across diverse cultures throughout history (Smith, 1991), humans have ever 
sought to make sense of their existence, putting it into a broader framework that provides reasons 
for our being here, reasons for our continuing to perpetuate life and delay death, and reasons for 
conducting ourselves in one manner rather than another. It is perhaps a necessary component of 
being human to ask "why" questions about our individual lives, about life itself, and about 
existence in general, with the "answers" to such questions emerging out of our relationships with 
one another, our relationship with the world, our relationship with whatever transcends this 
world, and our relationship with our deepest self-consciousness. Humanity's pervasive will 
towards finding meaning in existence implies that the pursuit of, and some degree of resolution 
about existential meaning is valuable, healthy, and adaptive. 
During the years immediately preceding and following one of the more absurd chapters 
in human history, WWII and the holocaust, anticipation of modern humanity’s particular 
vulnerability to the sufferings of existential neurosis and meaninglessness were bubbling into the 
collective consciousness of intellects of the time, including some prominent students of Freud. 
For instance, Carl Jung (1933) claimed that the cause of neurosis in the modern patient was 
“having no love, but only sexuality; no faith, because he is afraid to grope in the dark; no hope, 
because he is disillusioned by the world and by life; and no understanding, because he has failed  
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to read the meaning of his own existence” (p 260).  Putting it more simply he said, “a psycho-
neurosis must be understood as the suffering of a human being who has not discovered what life 
means for him” (p 260). However, though Jung was unambiguous in citing meaningless as the 
fundamental clinical concern for modern humans, current clinical research on existential 
meaning descends more directly from another of Freud’s students. It was Viktor Frankl who 
brought the study of existential meaning solidly under the scrutiny of clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists in 1946, with his From Death Camp to Existentialism, in which he described the 
human quest for meaning and outlined an existential psychology (Frankl, 1992). In this original 
German version of the more famous and later published Man's Search for Meaning, Frankl 
described the three primary components of his clinically oriented, existential psychology. These 
components are freedom of the will, the will to meaning, and the meaning of life (Frankl, 1966; 
Frankl, 1988; Frankl, 1992; Wong, 1998a; Barnes, 2000). According to Frankl’s theory, freedom 
of the will refers to the importance of affirming one’s freedom to choose one's behavior and 
attitudes throughout life, despite limiting conditions and inevitable hardships such as suffering, 
guilt, and death. The second concept, the will to meaning, involves the vital and uniquely human 
motivation towards a self-transcendent purpose, or a thing greater than oneself in which one 
might participate and thereby contribute to humanity, existence, life, etc. According to Frankl, to 
ignore the will to meaning and rather make pleasure or avoidance of suffering one's primary aim 
is to turn one's proper end on its head and engage in pursuits that will inevitably be self-
destructive. The third part of Frankl's theory, the meaning of life, involves an understanding that 
life has a unique purpose for each of us that is present even through seeming absurdity. Frankl 
described reaching this understanding as uncovering not ". . . what we expected from life, but 
rather what life expected from us" (Frankl, 1992, p 85). For Frankl, acknowledgement and 
embodiment of these three principles within one's life was vital, for otherwise, an existential 
 3
neurosis could occur that might lead to addiction, depression, or death (often by suicide).  
The existential psychology that emerged from Frankl's work, and its relevance to 
mainstream clinical psychology, has been summarized many times, with particularly clear 
expositions by Maddi (1967), Yalom (1980), Reker (2000), and Wong (1997 & 1998a). Most 
relevant to clinical psychology is the diathesis-stress model of existential neurosis. Maddi (1967) 
describes existential neurosis as manifesting through cognitive symptoms of perceived 
meaninglessness and a lack of value for one's activities, affective symptoms of boredom, a 
conspicuous lack of emotion, and depressive mood, and behavioral symptoms of disengagement 
from activity. The diathesis or premorbid attitude involved in existential neurosis is often called 
an existential vacuum, and it is presumed to involve a reductionist, or "nothing but . . ." (Yalom, 
1980), view of oneself and humanity. Someone experiencing an existential vacuum 
conceptualizes ideals and values as illusory, as nothing more than epiphenomena resulting from 
biological drives and environmental pressures (Maddi, 1967), and as a result will feel "powerless 
against social pressures from without, and powerless in the face of biological pressures from 
within" (p 315). In contrast, what Maddi (1967) calls the ideal attitude involves viewing the self 
as purposive, as determining itself by making decisions, and as engaging conscientiously in 
"imagination, judgment, and symbolization" (p 319). The influence of biological and social 
drives on thought, behavior, and affect ought to be acknowledged, but the healthy individual 
presumably sees herself as determined mostly by her commitments to certain values and her 
decisions to fulfill particular intentions based on those values. When faced with stressors such as 
environmental change or biological malfunction, the individual with the ideal or meaning-filled 
view is able to transcend her current distressing conditions because she views herself as able to 
determine her attitude with respect to suffering (freedom of the will), she is invested in pursuits 
that are beyond her own self-interest (will to meaning), and she is adept at finding meaning even 
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through absurdity (meaning of life). On the other hand, individuals with the premorbid or 
reductionist view will decompensate due to an inability to transcend and derive meaning from 
the immediate, unpleasurable circumstances that they might face. 
Existential neurosis could be considered the disorder of our age: Consider the demise of 
activities that Fabry (1998) has noted engage humans in vertical or transcendent cogitation, such 
as metaphysical philosophy and religion, as well as the concurrent rise of reductionism and 
hedonism. Such a situation promotes a belief that ideals and values are illusory and that the 
phenomena we would perceive as meaningful (e.g., love, altruism, and spirit) are reducible to 
less meaningful phenomena (e.g., dyadic interactions among microscopic, material particles). 
Contrast this nihilistic attitude with a more inspiring and spiritual one, which suggests that 
underlying the various phenomena we consider meaningful is something incomprehensibly more 
meaningful. Due to the particular relevance of existential neurosis for current society, the 
antidote to this disorder (i.e. existential meaning) is an important topic of study. 
Despite the obvious importance of studying existential meaning, empirical investigation 
of the psychosocial causes and consequences of the perception of meaning in life has crept at a 
snail's pace. The main reason for this seems to be that those interested in the study of meaning 
have shied away from thorough quantification and measurement (Harris & Standard, 2001). One 
manifestation of this problem is that the Purpose In Life Test (PIL, Crumbaugh & Maholick, 
1964; Crumbaugh, 1968) has for too long been the most popular existentially oriented 
standardized assessment instrument. The PIL is based on a vague conceptualization of existential 
meaning (Yalom, 1980), it has a complex and inconsistent factor structure that does not parallel 
theory underlying the measure's development (Reker & Cousins, 1979; Dufton & Pearlman, 
1986, as cited in Pargament, 1999; Chamberlain & Zika, 1988a; Reker, 2000), and there is little 
support for its convergent and discriminant validity, that is, little evidence that it measures 
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perceived meaning in life versus life satisfaction (Yalom, 1980), social desirability (Braun & 
Dolmino, 1978), or depression (Dyck, 1987). Yalom (1980) criticized the PIL's content validity 
and conceptual clarity, noting that it confuses existential meaning per se with variables that, 
while perhaps related to or influenced by meaning, are not definitive of the construct. One 
illustration of this problem is a study (Lester & Badro, 1992) in which it was demonstrated, 
using the PIL as a measure of meaning, that existential meaning could predict variance in 
suicidality beyond the variance predicted by the Beck Depression Inventory. When conducting 
their analyses, the researchers deleted the suicide question contained in the Beck Depression 
Inventory because it was obviously confounded with the dependent variable, suicidality. They 
did not mention that the PIL itself has a suicide question, and they did not mention whether or 
not they deleted that question before conducting their analyses, an act of omission that could 
make the study's results misleading. 
Current Theory and Research 
Personal Meaning. One lesson learned from the lack of conceptual clarity underlying the 
PIL's development and its consequent psychometric and content related inadequacies is that it is 
important to have a straightforward definition of existential meaning which can underlie our 
assessment instruments. Yalom (1980) noted that when discussing meaning, we usually are 
referring to a sense of coherence or understanding of our existence as well as a sense of purpose, 
direction, or function towards which we can aim. The twin concepts of coherence and  purpose 
are indeed the primary focuses in other theorists' thinking about existential meaning. For 
example, Reker (2000) defines the construct as "the cognizance of order, coherence, and purpose 
in one's existence, the pursuit and attainment of worthwhile goals, and an accompanying sense of 
fulfillment." Battista and Almond (1973) define meaning as having a positively valued life 
framework or philosophy that one sees oneself as fulfilling. Klinger's (1998) etymological 
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analysis suggests that meaning's essence involves "intentionality and purpose", and Frankl's 
(1992) definition of meaning as perceiving oneself as having a unique purpose or function to 
fulfill has been discussed already. An integrative definition of existential meaning based on these 
definitions is, perceiving oneself as having a coherent framework for viewing life that provides a 
sense of purpose or direction, which, if lived with in accord, can lead to a sense of fulfillment. 
The earliest conceptualization of meaning consistent with the integrative definition just 
provided and from which was developed a measurement instrument with adequate psychometric 
properties was that of Positive Life Regard, developed by Battista and Almond (1973). Battista 
and Almond defined positive life regard as an individual’s having a general framework or 
philosophy for viewing her life and having a sense of fulfillment related to living in accord with 
that framework. They constructed the life regard index (LRI) to assess this construct. The LRI 
has two sub-scales, one measuring an individual's having arrived at a framework or philosophy 
of life (i.e. LRI-framework), and the other measuring the individual's perceiving herself as living 
in accord with that framework or philosophy (LRI-fulfillment). The two sub-scales can be 
summed to form an overall life regard or existential meaning score.  
Most analyses of the LRI's construct validity suggest that it is an adequate to good 
measure of existential meaning. Factor analyses conducted within various populations support 
the instrument’s factorial validity (Chamberlain & Zika, 1988a; Debats, 1990; Debats, Van Der 
Lubbe, & Wezeman, 1993; Van Ranst & Marcoen, 1997), that is, the extent to which its items 
cluster together statistically in a way that parallels the theory underlying the measure's 
development. The two sub-scales have a correlation of r = .54 (Debats, 1990), and LRI scores, 
framework scores, and fulfillment scores have been found to have 5-week test-retest reliabilities 
of r = .80, .73, and .79, respectively (Debats et al., 1993). Regarding criterion validity, LRI 
scores are related to respondents answering affirmatively to the question, "Is there any 
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philosophy of life that has any significance to you at the moment?" (Debats, 1990), degree of 
self-reported commitment to meaningful activities (Debats, 1999), self-reported incidents of 
having found meaning through coping with crises, as well as the number of words used for 
describing moments of perceived meaning in life (Debats, Drost, & Hansen, 1995). 
Harris and Standard (2001) investigated the LRI-Revised (LRI-R), which is a more 
recent version of the LRI developed by Debats (1998). This measure is a slight reworking of the 
original in that its items are in a different order and three items were slightly reworded. When 
Harris and Standard factor analyzed the scale within a heterogeneous population of US adults 
ranging in age from 20 to 80 years, two primary factors emerged. All but one of the framework 
items loaded most substantially on the factor defined primarily by framework items and all but 4 
of the fulfillment items loaded most substantially on the factor defined primarily by fulfillment 
items. For further review and discussion of the LRI, see Debats (1998) and Reker (2000). 
In terms of its factor structure, internal consistency, convergent validity, and criterion 
validity, the LRI passes most tests adequately, but there is a troubling issue on which the LRI 
warrants the same type of criticism that can be leveled at the PIL. The LRI's Fulfillment sub-
scale to a large degree taps a sense of feeling good about one's life. (Consider these items: Living 
is deeply fulfilling; I really feel good about my life; Other people seem to feel better about their 
lives than I do;, When I look at my life I feel the satisfaction of really having worked to 
accomplish something; I have real passion in my life; I feel that I'm really going to attain what I 
want in life; I get so excited by what I'm doing that I find new stores of energy I didn't know that 
I had; Nothing very outstanding ever seems to happen to me; I feel that I am living fully). Such 
items tap directly the variables that the LRI is often used to predict (such as elation, emotional 
well-being, and depression). Thus, these outcome variables to an extent define the measure being 
used to predict them, and significant relationships between LRI-fulfillment and these variables 
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are virtually guaranteed. The LRI-fulfillment sub-scale should therefore not be used to predict 
emotional constructs that primarily involve feeling good or bad about one's life, because LRI-
fulfillment is a direct measure of these constructs. But because the LRI is separated into 
fulfillment and framework sub-scales, the primarily cognitive aspect of having meaning (having 
a framework for viewing one's life) can be examined separately from the rather affective 
consequences of living up to one's meaning (feeling fulfilled by one's framework and one's living 
in accord with it.) If one is aiming at a conservative assessment of the relationship between 
meaning and psychological health (i.e., an approach which is least likely to guarantee the results 
one "is looking for"), then the author suggests that the LRI-framework most purely taps the 
concept of existential meaning, whereas the LRI-fulfillment sub-scale taps the self-efficacy 
required to live up to one's meaning and the affective quality resulting from the fulfillment of 
that meaning.  
Spiritual Meaning. The concept of existential meaning as measured by the LRI-R-
framework involves viewing one's individual life as having meaning, but it does not necessarily 
involve viewing life itself as having meaning. The LRI-R-framework assesses what Yalom 
(1980) calls “terrestrial meaning”, which is distinct from what he calls “cosmic meaning”. For 
Frankl (1988 & 1992), an individual's purpose in life was not something to be created based on 
that individual's preferences in life or expectations for life, but it was rather given to the 
individual by life itself, based on life's expectations for that individual. By using such language, 
Frankl moved beyond mere personal meaning into transpersonal, cosmic, or what the author 
terms spiritual meaning. Spiritual meaning is not conceptualized as a mere construct of the 
individual but as something that inheres in existence itself. It is a capital "M" Meaning around 
which one can form a small "m", personal meaning. As Yalom (1980) notes, spiritual, 
transpersonal, or cosmic meaning has often been derived from religion. And although religious 
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views differ on how existence comes to have meaning, they tend to share the idea that life 
somehow has or has been given its own intentional or purposive quality to which one can relate 
and with which one can harmonize. It is not the case necessarily, however, that perceiving life as 
having meaning need derive from religion. Through philosophical engagement, through 
relationships, and through various other experiences, people can discover "on their own" what 
they perceive as life's meaning, such that the author defines perceived cosmic, transpersonal, or 
spiritual meaning as belief that life or some force of which life is a function has a purpose, will, 
or way in which individuals participate. This definition captures the sense that spiritual people 
have that they are participants in something that transcends them. And inasmuch as spiritual 
people believe that we are all participants in, or parts of whatever is believed to be life's 
meaning, we each have particular purposes or functions to play in manifesting that meaning. 
This links the construct of spiritual meaning to one of “calling”, or of feeling called on by Life 
(or Tao, God, Self, Dharmakaya, Being, or whatever Force it is in which one believes oneself to 
be a participant) to proceed in a certain direction. This notion of calling, as well as the idea of 
participating in an overarching meaning that transcends oneself, makes the idea of spiritual 
meaning unique, potentially relevant to psychological well-being, and therefore worthy of 
further empirical investigation. 
A measure of existential meaning is desirable that taps a perception of spiritual meaning 
that is not necessarily linked to a particular religion. Mascaro, Rosen, and Morey (2004) 
constructed such a measure, now called the Spiritual Meaning Scale (SMS), that is not geared 
towards a particular religion, but measures the extent to which a person believes that life or some 
force of which life is a function has a purpose, will, or way in which individuals participate. The 
SMS (Mascaro et al., 2004) is a single scale, 14-item self-report inventory that asks respondents 
to rate its items on a 5-point scale ranging from I totally disagree to I totally agree. Items were 
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chosen for the inventory that a group of professors of philosophy and psychology, as well as 
Ph.D. graduate students in clinical psychology, rated as fitting adequately with the Spiritual 
Meaning construct as defined by the author. When subjected to factor analysis within a 
population of undergraduates, the SMS’s items loaded on one major factor, with items loading 
on that factor between .46 and .70 (Mascaro et al., 2004). The scale was correlated with 
conceptually related measures such as the LRI-R-framework and the later-to-be-discussed 
Personal Meaning Profile (Wong, 1998b). The SMS was not correlated with short form A 
(Reynolds, 1982) of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and it was positively 
correlated with need for cognition (r = .21), or the tendency to enjoy and engage in objective 
thought. The small but positive correlation with need for cognition is important, because a high 
spiritual meaning score should reflect an objective thinking style rather than an unreflective 
thinking style that might be more susceptible to uncritical acceptance of externally imposed 
dogma. 
 Implicit/Informal Meaning. A newly explicated, meaning-related construct that the 
author feels is worthy of increased attention is that of implicit or informal meaning. Existential 
meaning is a universal concept that belongs to people in general, not just to researchers. 
Respecting this fact, Wong (1998b) thought it important to analyze the notions of lay people 
about factors that comprise a meaningful life. Using qualitative and then factor analytic 
techniques, Wong isolated seven factors that are normatively viewed as characteristic of 
someone whose life has meaning. These factors are achievement (i.e. pursuit and attainment of 
significant life goals), relationship (i.e. general social adeptness), religion (i.e. having affirmative 
beliefs about and a relationship with the divine), self-transcendence (i.e. engagement in selfless 
pursuits that have beneficial effects on those besides the individual), self-acceptance (i.e. a 
humble acceptance of one's limitations), intimacy (i.e. having emotionally close and loving 
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relationships), and fair treatment (i.e. perceiving a degree of justice in one's life). Wong 
constructed the Personal Meaning Profile (PMP) as a measure of the extent to which individuals 
report exemplifying these seven factors in their own lives. He constructed the measure based on 
factor analyses and the extent to which subjects rated each item as "characteristic of an ideally 
meaningful life."  
The latest version of the PMP is a 57-item, Likert format self-report inventory that 
measures the extent to which an individual reports valuing and successfully pursuing those areas 
that are normatively viewed as comprising a meaningful life. The measure consists of seven sub-
scales corresponding to the seven categories listed above. The sub-scales can be analyzed 
separately or they can be summed to form a PMP-total score. Wong found the PMP and its seven 
sub-scales converged with criterion items such as My life as a whole has meaning; I led a 
meaningful life in the past; At present, I find my life very meaningful; I look forward to a 
meaningful life in the future; and I derive a great deal of personal meaning from my future 
expectations. In other analyses of its construct validity, the PMP has been found to converge 
with the conceptually related LRI-framework and SMS (Mascaro et al., 2004; Mascaro & Rosen, 
2005). However, the PMP has also been found to have a substantial correlation with short form 
A of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, indicating that social desirability should be 
controlled in analyses using the PMP (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005).  
Existential Meaning and Mental Health. Most of the quality research on existential 
meaning's relationship with mental health involves the LRI-framework. Within various 
populations, LRI-framework has been found to be related (in the appropriately healthy 
directions) to positive affect, negative affect, and life satisfaction (Chamberlain & Zika, 1988b; 
Zika & Chamberlain, 1992); anxiety and depression (Zika & Chamberlain, 1992; Debats, 1990; 
Debats et al., 1993); happiness (Debats, 1990; Debats et al., 1993; Debats, 1996; Scanell et al., 
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2002); emotional dyscontrol and psychological well-being (Zika & Chamberlain, 1992); elation 
(Dabats, 1990); spiritual well-being (Harris & Standard, 2001; Scannell et al., 2002); 
hopelessness (Harris & Standard, 2001); and agoraphobia, somatization, dependency, sleep 
disturbance, and general psychological distress (Debats et al., 1993). With respect to more 
conservative and thorough analyses, Mascaro et al. (2004) found the LRI-R-framework to 
predict variance in depression and hope beyond the variance predicted by the Big Five 
personality factors and social desirability. In a rare longitudinal study of LRI-framework, Debats 
(1996) analyzed pre- and post-treatment levels of psychiatric symptoms, happiness, and self-
esteem in 105 patients with various, non-psychotic disorders as determined by DSM-III criteria. 
Participants’ LRI-framework levels at pre-treatment predicted post-treatment happiness and 
symptom levels, controlling for initial happiness and symptom levels. In another longitudinal 
study with a non-clinical, undergraduate population, LRI-R-framework scores at baseline 
predicted levels of depression and hope two months later, controlling for baseline levels of hope, 
depression, social desirability, and the Big Five (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005). 
 The newly developed PMP and SMS, measures of implicit meaning and spiritual 
meaning, respectively, are also related to mental health. Both instruments are predictably 
correlated with measures of depression, anxiety, hope, and antisocial characteristics, and both are 
related to all these variables except for anxiety when variance is removed that is attributable to 
the Big Five personality factors and social desirability (Mascaro et al., 2004). Moreover, in a 
longitudinal investigation, the PMP at baseline predicted levels of depression and hope two 
months later, controlling for initial levels of depression, hope, social desirability, and the Big 
Five (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005). 
Evidence supporting the clinical importance of meaning comes not just from the three 
self-report measures noted above. In Jung’s (1933) classic work, Modern Man in Search of a 
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Soul, he maintained that a substantial percentage of his patients suffered from meaninglessness 
secondary to a loss of spiritual orientation. Related to this, he stated: “Among all my patients in 
the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there has not been one whose problem in 
the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life . . . and none of them has been 
really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. This of course has nothing whatever to do 
with a particular creed or membership of a church” (p 264). Sticking closer to quantitative 
evidence, Yalom (1980) describes a study of 40 outpatients in which 12 to 22 percent of them 
(depending on whether the assessment was that of the patients or a group of clinicians) had 
problems centering around existential meaning. These numbers may increase in different 
populations. Consider that 40% of cancer patients report needing help “finding meaning in my 
life now” and 28% specifically report needing to talk with someone “about the meaning of life” 
(Moadel et al., 1999). In addition, undergraduates who reported having experienced times when 
they felt their lives were meaningless were more likely to have required psychological 
counseling (Debats et al., 1995). Finally, Addis, Truax, and Jacobson (1995) cited existential 
concerns as one of 8 major reasons people report for becoming depressed. It thus appears that 
perceptions of existential meaning or lack thereof have important ramifications for the mental 
health professions. 
There is considerable evidence suggesting that existential meaning is related to 
psychological health in general. However, there is a dearth of longitudinal research that could 
speak more directly to existential meaning's etiological significance with respect to specific 
clinical phenomena. It is for this reason that the author conducted the present two-month long 
study of the influence of existential meaning, as assessed by the three measurement instruments 
herein reviewed (i.e. the PMP, SMS, and LRI-R-framework), on depression as well as on the 
positive variable of hope, which has been demonstrated to have profound effects on mental 
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health (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Beck et al., 1990; Arnau, Rosen, Finch, & 
Rhudy, 2002; Snyder, 2002). With meaninglessness being such a unique issue for contemporary 
society, it is important to study its consequences, so as to expose a potentially powerful driving 
force behind a large proportion of the hopelessness and depression that we currently face. In the 
current study, longitudinal design, powerful statistical procedures, and quality measurement 
devices were utilized in order to assess in a scientifically thorough manner the role played by 
existential meaning in the promotion of hope and alleviation of depressive symptoms. 
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PROPOSED STUDY AND HYPOTHESES 
 The primary aim of the present study was to investigate the relationship of existential 
meaning as measured by total scores from the Personal Meaning Profile (PMP), the framework 
sub-scale of the Life Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R-framework), and the Spiritual Meaning 
Scale (SMS), with the variables of depression and hope over two one-month time periods. The 
author’s first hypothesis was that the common factor of existential meaning tapped by the SMS, 
LRI-R-framework, and PMP influences and is also influenced by hope and depression. The 
PMP, LRI-R-framework, and SMS were chosen to measure existential meaning primarily for 
three reasons: 1, because they each approach the concept of existential meaning from a slightly 
different angle while maintaining moderate to high correlations with one another and tapping the 
core concepts of coherence and purpose; 2, because they have good psychometric characteristics 
and are not confounded by the variables in relationship to which they would be assessed; and 3, 
because the point where the three constructs converge seems special—that is, the point where an 
individual perceives meaningfulness in life itself, is able to generate a specific purpose for 
herself as an individual, and manifests those qualities that would cause others to judge her life as 
meaningful. Of final note with regard to the assessment of meaning is that the SMS and LRI-R-
framework measure an explicit sense of meaning (i.e. an individual’s overt awareness of 
meaning in life), whereas the PMP measures an implicit sense of meaning (i.e. an individual’s 
reported engagement in meaningful behavior and thought without necessarily reporting an 
explicit sense of meaning in life). Mascaro and Rosen (2005) found that measuring meaning at 
both explicit and implicit levels results in a more thorough and clinically relevant form of 
assessment. 
It was decided to study meaning in relationship to hope and depression because Frankl’s 
initial contention was that having meaning in life allows for hope even in virtually hopeless 
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situations (Frankl, 1992). Also, the existential neurosis (Frankl, 1988, 1992; Maddi, 1967) that 
can presumably result from a lack of existential meaning involves symptoms that would clearly 
qualify it as being a form of depression. Moreover, the construct of existential meaning is future 
looking and involves engagement, motivation, and direction. If you consider the person who is 
not future-looking, who is disengaged, not motivated, and without direction, such a person is 
essentially depressed and hopeless. It was supposed, therefore, that gains in levels of existential 
meaning would lead to decreases in depressive symptoms and increases in hope, while losses of 
existential meaning would lead to increased depression and hopelessness. However, because 
depression and hopelessness are powerful, perseverating conditions that broadly affect cognition, 
affect, and behavior, the author also postulated that increases in these variables would lead to 
slight decreases in levels of existential meaning.  
The author’s second main hypothesis was that existential meaning acts as a 
resiliency/vulnerability factor in the face of stress caused by negative life events. Therefore, it 
was predicted that the influence of existential meaning on depression and hope would be more 
powerful in interaction with negative life events than under low stress conditions (or 
correspondingly that the unhealthy relationship of stress with hopelessness and depression would 
be ameliorated for individuals with a solid sense of existential meaning). This is in accord with 
Frankl's (1992) and Maddi's (1967) contention that existential neurosis results from an 
interaction between negative life events and low levels of existential meaning. 
A final issue the author wished to explore involves the idea that different forms of 
meaning (particularly spiritual versus personal meaning) might be more likely than others to 
mediate mental health outcomes in different types of people. Specifically, the author 
hypothesized tentatively that higher levels of internal locus of control are linked to an increased 
relationship between personal meaning and depression/hope, while they are linked to a 
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decreased relationship between spiritual meaning and depression/hope. 
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METHODS 
Participants 
The author recruited 574 undergraduates participating in the Texas A&M Psychology 
Department’s subject pool. Students participating in the Introductory Psychology at Texas A&M 
are required to participate in 5 credits worth of research. On an internet-based form where 
students volunteered for participation, the nature of the study was described briefly, and it was 
indicated that by completing the baseline testing session, a student would receive 1 credit, and 
that completing each testing session after that would give her/him 1 credit per session.  
Over the course of three testing sessions (each separated by one month), 214 (37%) of 
the original 574 volunteers either dropped out of the study or failed to properly complete the 
survey. However, 35 of those who did not complete the entire survey were missing only a few 
items, so these people were included in the study after each of their missing items was replaced 
with the mean score for that item. This resulted in an attrition rate of 179 (31%) and a final 
sample of 395. Relative to those who did not complete the study, the 395 completers did not 
score differently (to a degree that was statistically significant) on any measure expect for the 
Adult State Hope Scale (p < .05). Therefore, there is minimal to no evidence that attrition 
significantly affected the study, and all analyses reported in the remainder of this paper were 
conducted on the final sample of 395. 
The sample of 395 completers was homogeneous in terms of age, ethnicity, and spiritual 
orientation. The mean age was 19.01 (SD = 2.08), and 95% of participants were between the 
ages of 18 and 21. Fourteen individuals (3.5% of the sample) described themselves as Asian, 7 
(1.8%) as Black, 321 (81.3%) as Caucasian, 39 (9.9%) as Hispanic, 1 (0.3%) as Native 
American, and 13 (3.3%) as some other unidentified ethnicity. Regarding spiritual orientation, 8 
individuals (2.0% of the sample) described themselves as Agnostic, 5 (1.3%) as Atheist, 2 
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(0.5%) as Buddhist, 359 (90.9%) as Christian, 1 (0.3%) as Deist, 1 (0.3%) as Hindu, 1 (0.3%) as 
Islamic, 2 (0.5%) as Jewish, 1 (0.3%) as Polytheistic, and 15 (3.8%) as some other unidentified 
spiritual orientation. Two hundred seventy two individuals (68.9% of the sample) reported that 
they were female, 122 (30.9%) that they were male, and one individual (0.3%) did not report 
gender. 
Procedure  
Once participants arrived at the initial testing session, the nature of the study was 
described to them and they indicated their consent by signing a written informed consent form 
outlining the nature of participation. At this point, they were administered all the measures 
included in the study. When they were done completing all the measures, they were given their 
one point of research credit. Next, arrangements were made for meeting to complete similar 
measures on a date one month after the initial session, then one month after that time point. Each 
student who agreed to return for the subsequent time points was reminded via email within 4 
days of her/his scheduled session. In each wave of the study after the first, students received one 
credit point, thus giving participants a maximum of 3 credits towards the 5 required by their 
introductory psychology course. 
Materials 
Meaning. Three measures were used to assess the variable of existential meaning: the 
most recent version of the Spiritual Meaning Scale (SMS, Mascaro & Rosen, 2006), which is 
different from the original (Mascaro et al., 2004) only in that an additional item was added (i.e., 
There is something purposeful at the heart of this world), the Personal Meaning Profile (PMP, 
Wong, 1998b), and the framework sub-scale from the Life Regard Index-Revised (LRI-R-
framework, Debats, 1998). The SMS (with its newly added item) is a 15-item, Likert format self-
report inventory assessing the extent to which individuals believe that life has inherent meaning 
 20
in which they and other individuals participate. It includes such positively worded items as Life 
is inherently meaningful and There are certain jobs, activities, or services to which I feel called, 
and such negatively worded items as There is no reason or meaning underlying human existence 
and There is no particular reason why I exist. Participants indicate their degree of agreement 
with each statement on a 5-point scale. In the present study, the SMS had coefficient alphas of 
.90, .92, and .93 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability from time 1 
to 2 and from time 2 to 3 was .82, and its two-month test-retest reliability was .78.  
The PMP is a 57-item, Likert format self-report inventory assessing the extent to which 
individuals exhibit the attitudes and behaviors that are normatively judged as comprising a 
meaningful life. Such attitudes and behaviors fall into the categories of achievement, 
relationships, religion, self-transcendence, self-acceptance, intimacy, and fair treatment, with 
each category represented by a sub-scale of the PMP. The PMP's sub-scales can be summed to 
form a total score, which was used in the present study. Representing the domains of 
achievement, relationship, religion, self-transcendence, self-acceptance, intimacy, and fair 
treatment, respectively, the PMP contains such items as I strive to achieve my life goals; I care 
about other people; I am at peace with God; I strive to make this world a better place; I accept 
my limitations; I have someone to share intimate feelings with; and I have found that there is 
rough justice in the world. Participants indicate their degree of agreement with each item on a 7-
point scale. In the present study, the PMP had coefficient alphas of .96, .97, and .97 at times 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability from time 1 to 2 and from time 2 to 3 was 
.83, and its two-month test-retest reliability was .78. 
The LRI-R-framework is a 14-item, Likert format self-report scale assessing the extent 
to which an individual reports having a framework or philosophy for living. It includes such 
positively worded items as I feel like I have found a really significant meaning for leading my 
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life and I have a philosophy of life that really gives my living significance, and such negatively 
worded items as I really don't have much of a purpose for living, even for myself and I really 
don't believe in anything about my life very deeply. Participants indicate their degree of 
agreement with each statement on a 3-point scale. In the present study, the LRI-R-framework 
had coefficient alphas of .82, .85, and .86 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-
retest reliability was .75 from time 1 to 2, .79 from time 2 to 3, and its two-month test-retest 
reliability was .74. 
Depression. Depression was measured using the depression scale from the Personality 
Assessment Inventory (PAI-dep; Morey, 1991), the depression scale from the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS-dep; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995a), and the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The DASS is a 42-item, Likert format self-
report inventory that divides into three scales that measure depression, generalized anxiety 
symptoms, and the more physiological symptoms of anxiety that often characterize panic attacks. 
The DASS has been shown to have excellent reliability and validity, and to compare favorably to 
the Beck Depression and Anxiety Inventories (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995b; Brown, Chorpita, 
Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997). The DASS-dep contains items such as I couldn't seem to 
experience any positive feelings at all and I felt sad and depressed, for which participants 
indicate the extent to which the statement has characterized them, on a 4 point scale, over the 
past week. Item number 38 of the DASS, I felt that life was meaningless, was eliminated from all 
analyses because it is confounded with the independent variable of existential meaning. With this 
item deleted, the DASS-dep had coefficient alphas of .92, .91, and .93 at times 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .52 from time 1 to 2, .67 from time 2 to 3, 
and its two-month test-retest reliability was .46. 
The BDI-II is a 21-item self-report inventory measuring depressive symptomatology. 
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For each item, the participant chooses one of four self-evaluative statements that range in 
severity from 0 to 3 and that might have characterized him or her over the past 2 weeks. There is 
strong support for the validity of the BDI-II and its incremental utility relative to the original 
BDI (Beck et al., 1996; Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). It contains items ranging in severity 
from I do not feel sad to I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it, and from I do not feel I am 
worthless to I feel utterly worthless. In the present study, the BDI-II had coefficient alphas of 
.87, .92, and .92 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .67 
from time 1 to 2, .72 from time 2 to 3, and its two-month test-retest reliability was .66. 
The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) is a broad ranging, clinical assessment 
device created for measuring "constructs that are central in treatment planning, implementation, 
and evaluation" (Morey, 1999, p 1083). The 344-item, Likert format self-report inventory 
contains 11 clinical scales, one of which is the 24-item depression scale, that measure clinical 
dysfunctions. The reliability and construct, criterion, and face validity of the PAI have been 
analyzed extensively and supported (Morey, 1999). The PAI-depression scale (PAI-dep) 
contains such positively worded items as Much of the time, I'm sad for no real reason and I 
hardly have any energy, and such negatively worded items as I have no trouble falling asleep 
and Lately I've been happy much of the time. Participants rate these items on a 4-point scale. In 
the present study, the PAI-dep had coefficient alphas of .87, .89, and .91 at times 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .70 from time 1 to 2, .78 from time 2 to 3, 
and its two-month test-retest reliability was .65. 
 Hope. The variable of hope was assessed using three measures: Snyder's Adult State 
Hope Scale (SHS; Snyder et al., 1996), the Herth Hope Scale (HHS; Herth, 1991), and the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al., 1974). The BHS is the most popular of the three 
measures, and there is substantial evidence for its reliability, validity, and clinical importance 
 23
(Beck et al., 1974; Beck et al., 1990). The BHS is a 20-item, true/false format, self-report 
inventory. It contains such negatively worded items as I look forward to the future with hope and 
enthusiasm, and such positively worded items as All I can see ahead of me is unpleasantness 
rather than pleasantness. In the present study, the BHS had coefficient alphas of .80, .81, and 
.85 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .72 from time 1 to 
2, .77 from time 2 to 3, and its two-month test-retest reliability was .68. 
More recently developed measures looking at hope as a positive variable are the SHS 
and HHS. The SHS has demonstrated good construct validity (Snyder et al., 1996; Lopez et al., 
2000). It consists of two factors, one called agency, pertaining to an individual’s perceived will 
to ends or goals, and another termed pathways, pertaining to the person’s awareness of means or 
pathways to those ends or goals. The scale contains 6 items to which participants respond on an 
eight point, Likert scale. It includes such items as If I should find myself in a jam, I could think of 
many ways out of it and At the present time, I am energetically pursuing my goals. In the present 
study, the SHS had coefficient alphas of .84, .87, and .89 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its 
one-month test-retest reliability was .62 from time 1 to 2, .70 from time 2 to 3, and its two-month 
test-retest reliability was .58. 
Herth’s measure of hope, which has also exhibited good reliability and construct validity 
(Herth, 1991; Arnau et al., 2002), taps a broader construct than Snyder’s or Beck's instruments, 
containing a hopelessness component containing such items as I feel overwhelmed and trapped 
and I feel scared about my future, a component similar to that of agency containing such items as 
I have goals for the next 3-6 weeks and I am committed to finding my way, and an additional 
component tapping optimism and perceived social support, containing such items as I can seek 
and receive help and I believe that good is always possible. The measure has 30 items, each 
rated on a four point, Likert format scale. For the proposed study, item number 24 on the Herth 
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Hope Scale (I know my life has meaning and purpose) was deleted from all analyses because it is 
confounded with the independent variable, existential meaning. With this item deleted, the HHS 
had coefficient alphas of .91, .93, and .95 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-
retest reliability was .78 from time 1 to 2, .84 from time 2 to 3, and its two-month test-retest 
reliability was .76. 
Stress. The Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire (USQ; Crandall, Preisler, & Aussprung, 
1992) was administered to assess the extent to which participants had undergone stressful life 
events in the week prior to testing. The USQ is an 83-item checklist that contains an array of 
negative life events, a substantial proportion of which are directly related to attending college. 
Some examples include Death (of a family member or friend), Got to class late, and Erratic 
schedule. Exhibiting adequate psychometric characteristics and minimal contamination with 
negative, affective content, the USQ has been endorsed as a valid way of assessing degree of 
stressors experienced in college undergraduate populations (Crandall et al., 1992). Total USQ 
scores are obtained by summing the number of items endorsed by participants. Weighted and un-
weighted versions of the USQ are highly correlated and do not differ significantly in terms of the 
variables they predict (Crandall et al., 1992). In the present study, the USQ had coefficient 
alphas of .86, .85, and .86 at times 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability 
from time 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 was .70, and its two-month test-retest reliability was .61. 
Social Desirability. In order to control for participants' tendencies towards repressive 
styles or "faking good", the author administered a shortened version of the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability scale (MCSD), which has exhibited good construct validity (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964). Called short form A of the MCSD, the scale developed by Reynolds (1982) has 
substantially better psychometric characteristics than the original MCSD (Loo & Thorpe, 2000). 
Short form A of the MCSD is an eleven item, true/false test containing such positively worded 
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items as No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener and I have never felt that I was 
punished without cause, and such negatively worded items as It is sometimes hard for me to go 
on with my work if I am not encouraged, and I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
In the present study, the measure had coefficient alphas of .59, .67, and .69 at times 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .72 from time 1 to 2, .71 from time 2 to 3, 
and its two-month test-retest reliability was .70. 
Locus of Control. The extent to which individuals vary in the extent to which they 
attribute control over life events to themselves was measured with the Internal (I) scale of 
Levenson’s (1974) revision and expansion of Rotter’s (1966) Internal-External (I-E) scale. 
Besides finding that internal and external locus of control are orthogonal constructs, Levenson 
found data indicating that external locus of control itself can be divided into two orthogonal 
constructs: belief in powerful others who dominate one’s life, and belief that one’s life is 
dominated mostly by chance. Levenson’s revised version of the I-E scale is an improvement 
over the older version in that its I, P, and C scales reflect the independence of the constructs of 
internal locus of control (I), locus of control in powerful others (P), and locus of control in 
chance (C). Levenson (1974) found substantial support for the reliability and validity of the I, P, 
and C scales. Although only the I scale was analyzed in the current study, the items from all 
three scales were administered together. The items are rated on a 6-point, Likert scale. In the 
present study, the I scale had coefficient alphas of .67, .72, and .78 at times 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. Its one-month test-retest reliability was .63 from time 1 to 2, .64 from time 2 to 3, 
and its two-month test-retest reliability was .58. 
Statistical Analyses 
 Latent Cross-Lagged Panel Analysis. Through structural equation modeling, a latent 
cross-lagged panel analysis was used to examine the first hypothesis regarding the reciprocally 
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causal relationship between depression/hope and existential meaning over the course of two 
months. As the proposed model indicates (see Figure 1), the analysis modeled, for two 
consecutive one month time periods, meaning’s ability to predict hope/depression one month 
later (controlling for the stability of depression/hope over time). In Figure 1, one variable’s  
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Figure 1. Latent Cross-Lagged Panel Model of the Relationship between Meaning and 
Hope/Depression over 2 Month’s Time. 
 
ability to prospectively predict another is represented by diagonal single-headed arrows, and the 
stability of a variable over time is represented by single headed arrows running from the 
respective variable at one time point to the same variable at the next time point. The double-
headed arrows represent correlations between variables. Ellipses represent the latent hope, 
depression, and meaning variables, while the small circles (or disturbances) indicate the amount 
of variance of an endogenous variable that is unaccounted for by regression lines (single-headed 
arrows) to it. Disturbances in the current model therefore represent the portion of a variable that 
is unattributable to its stability over time or to its being predicted by another variable. So in 
Figure 1, the disturbances linked to Meaning at times 2 and 3 represents changes in meaning 
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over these 2 time points that are unattributable to depression or hope, while the small circles 
linked to hope/depression are the amount of change in these variables that is unattributable to 
meaning. Of course, separate panel analyses were used for observing the depression-meaning 
relationship and the hope-meaning relationship. 
An important issue to understand regarding the current cross-lagged panel model is that 
the set of diagonal arrows in the second panel (i.e., running from time 2 to time 3) take into 
account the degree to which changes in meaning over the first month of the study predict 
subsequent changes in depression/hope and vice versa. However, values for the diagonal arrows 
in the first panel (running from time1 to time2) do not model changes in a variable predicting 
subsequent changes in another variable. They rather represent a static variable’s ability to predict 
changes in another variable. The first set of cross-lags therefore reflect one variable’s serving as 
a diathesis or vulnerability for changes in another, and the second set of cross-lags reflect the 
extent to which changes in one variable lead to subsequently proportional changes in another. 
Because the second set of cross-lags estimates a phenomenon more directly linked to the study’s 
first hypothesis (i.e. that losses of meaning lead to increased depression/hopelessness and vice 
versa) than do the first set of cross-lags, the values for the second pair are of primary concern in 
the current study. Furthermore, because the two pairs of cross-lags reflect different forms of 
information, neither these nor the stability estimates were constrained to be equal across time 
points. Moreover, due to the youth of the current sample and the fact that the study begins at the 
beginning of a stressful college semester that is early in the academic careers of most of the 
participants, the system being evaluated is presumably not one that has reached equilibrium as 
conceptualized by Dwyer (1983), and the model of which, therefore, should not have the same 
constraints that Dwyer recommends for depicting a system that has reached equilibrium. 
However, because the disturbances for the variables at times 2 and 3 should both reflect changes 
 28
over the course of a month, correlations between the disturbances for meaning, hope, and 
depression were constrained to be equal at the two time points. 
Some features of the models of the meaning-hope and meaning-depression relationship 
are not depicted in Figure 1. One group of features is related to the measurement models, which 
involve the loading of indicators or observed variables on their respective latent variables or 
common factors. Recall that the SMS, LRI-R-framework, and PMP were used to measure 
meaning, so the common variance among these measures at each time point formed the latent 
meaning variable at each time point (i.e. the ellipses labeled Meaning in Figure 1). Similarly, the 
common variance among the DASS-dep, BDI-II, and PAI-dep formed the latent depression 
variable, and the common variance among the BHS, HHS, and SHS formed the latent hope 
variable. Loadings of indicators on their latent variables were constrained to be equal across the 
different time points, and error variances for the indicators were allowed to covary across all 
time points. Also notable regarding measurement models is that in order to set a metric for a 
latent variable (which is unobserved and therefore does not supply itself with a metric), the 
loading of an arbitrary indicator for that variable must be pre-established (usually at 1), so 
loadings for the PMP, PAI-dep, and SHS were set to 1 for the meaning, depression, and hope 
variables, respectively.  
Another key feature not depicted in Figure 1 relates to the structural model, which 
involves correlations and regression weights representing relationships among latent variables. A 
latent social desirability variable was formed by dividing short form A of the MCSD into two 
parts, one containing all the positively worded items and the other containing the reverse scored 
items. The latent social desirability variable formed from the common variance between these 
two parts of the MCSD was entered at each time point and allowed to predict variance in the 
latent depression, hope, and meaning variables at times 2 and 3, thus controlling for the effects 
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of social desirability (i.e. ensuring that meaning’s ability to predict depression or hope was in no 
way a function of a tendency in individuals to fake good or be self-deceptive). Regression 
weights for social desirability predicting meaning, hope, and depression were constrained to be 
equal at times 2 and 3. The indicator comprised by the MCSD’s positively worded items was set 
to 1, while the other indicator for the social desirability factor was constrained to be equal across 
time points. 
Upon analysis of the two models, should the values for the cross-lags in the second panel 
be significantly greater than zero despite the wealth of controls and constraints included, then 
psychometrically sound evidence would suggest that experiencing a decrease in one’s sense of 
existential meaning can lead to a decreased sense of hope and increased symptoms of depression, 
with such clinical dynamics in turn negatively influencing the experience of existential meaning. 
 Hierarchical Regression Analysis. To analyze the second hypothesis that meaning is a 
resiliency/vulnerability factor in the face of life stressors, the author employed hierarchical 
regression analysis. When conducting these analyses, depression was operationalized as a 
composite of standardized scores from the three depression measures, hope was operationalized 
as a composite of standardized scores from the three hope measures, and meaning was 
operationalized as a composite of standardized scores from the three meaning measures. The 
basic hypothesis was that for individuals with low degrees of existential meaning at baseline, 
there would be a positive relationship between the (residual) change in their reported levels of 
stress over the course of the study and the (residual) change in their levels of depression during 
the study (or a negative relationship between change in stress and hope), whereas this 
relationship would be less powerful or non-existent for individuals reporting high levels of 
existential meaning. Such results would indicate that having high levels of existential meaning 
protects people from the deleterious effects of stress. To assess this hypothesis, two regression 
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analyses were performed, one predicting hope at the end of the study’s two-month time interval 
and the other predicting depression. In step one of each regression, baseline depression, baseline 
social desirability, baseline meaning, baseline stress, and residual changes in stress were entered. 
In step two, participants’ baseline meaning multiplied by their residual stress-change scores were 
entered. It was hypothesized that entering the step two interaction between meaning and stress-
change would allow for the prediction of variance in depression and hope beyond that predicted 
by the variables in step one. This additional predicted variance should reflect an interaction such 
that the significant positive relationship between stress-change and depression-change (and the 
significant negative relationship between stress and hope) is weakened as meaning levels at 
baseline increase. 
An exploratory analysis of the extent to which internal locus of control moderates the 
relationships of spiritual and personal meaning with hope/depression was also tested using 
hierarchical regression analysis. Two regression analyses were conducted predicting two-month 
depression levels and two were conducted predicting two-month hope levels. In step one of each 
analysis, baseline levels of social desirability, depression/hope, locus of control, and either 
personal or spiritual meaning were entered, followed by the interaction of internal locus of 
control with either spiritual or personal meaning in step two. It was hypothesized tentatively that 
with increased levels of internal locus of control, the relationship between personal meaning and 
hope/depression would become more powerful, whereas the relationship between spiritual 
meaning and hope/depression would become less powerful. Confirmation of this hypothesis 
would indicate that different forms of meaning are differentially adaptive for different 
personality types. 
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 As summarized in Table 1, students’ levels of implicit meaning as measured by the 
Personal Meaning Profile increased over the course of the study to a statistically significant 
degree, as did their levels of hope on two of the three hope scales. In addition, their levels of 
depression on 2 of the 3 depression measures decreased significantly during the study. Table 1 
also indicates that women had higher scores than men on the Personal Meaning Profile, the 
Spiritual Meaning Scale, the Herth Hope Scale, and the Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire, 
suggesting that relative to men, women may experience increased levels of spiritual and implicit 
meaning, increased levels of some aspects of hope, and increased levels of stress. Regarding 
overall descriptive statistics, means on all the measures were comparable to those found in other 
studies utilizing similar populations. 
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of Meaning Measures (Concurrent Correlation Analyses) 
 Analyses of the Pearson correlations among variables, summarized in Tables 2, 3, and 4 
for baseline, time 2, and time 3, respectively, can give us a feel for the construct validity of the 
primary predictor variables (i.e., those assessing existential meaning). That is, the extent to 
which the meaning measures did not correlate with social desirability or stress, and were more 
highly correlated with one another than with the measures of depression, hope, or internal locus 
of control, is related to the extent to which they reflect an enduring and unique personality 
variable that might be labeled existential meaning. Significant correlations of meaning variables 
with stress would suggest that meaning changes as a function of changes in stress, whereas a 
personality variable ought to be less reactive than this. Correlations with social desirability 
would imply that self-reported meaning levels have some degree of confound with a tendency to 
fake good or be self-deceptive. And for a meaning measure to be more highly correlated with an 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Broken Down by Gender 
 
Females 
N = 272 
Males 
N = 122 
Overall 
N = 395 
Scale M SD M SD M SD 
Personal Meaning Profile (t1)
Ψ*
 323.68 39.66 312.63 46.37 320.21 42.06 
Personal Meaning Profile (t2)* 325.92 43.97 309.89 54.54 320.90 47.95 
Personal Meaning Profile (t3)* 328.67 46.84 316.02 57.42 324.69 50.57 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (t1)* 66.81 7.46 63.08 10.88 65.61 8.84 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (t2)* 66.64 8.37 62.24 11.93 65.24 9.83 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (t3)* 67.19 8.17 62.13 12.80 65.59 10.11 
LRI-R-framework (t1) 34.29 5.16 34.07 5.95 34.23 5.40 
LRI-R-framework (t2) 34.46 5.56 34.21 5.81 34.39 5.63 
LRI-R-framework (t3) 34.64 5.60 34.42 6.11 34.58 5.75 
DASS-depression (t1)
 Ψ
 5.26 6.06 5.97 7.18 5.47 6.42 
DASS-depression (t2) 5.12 5.81 6.39 7.13 5.51 6.26 
DASS-depression (t3) 4.58 5.56 5.25 7.02 4.78 6.04 
PAI-depression (t1) 14.32 9.50 14.35 9.04 14.31 9.34 
PAI-depression (t2) 14.03 9.83 15.14 11.05 14.36 10.21 
PAI-depression (t3) 13.19 10.60 14.43 12.20 13.57 11.11 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (t1)
 Ψ
 9.46 7.03 8.41 6.86 9.12 6.98 
Beck Depression Inventory -II (t2) 9.02 7.89 8.12 8.95 8.75 8.22 
Beck Depression Inventory -II (t3) 7.63 7.87 7.34 8.23 7.54 7.97 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (t1) 2.94 2.53 3.35 3.62 3.07 2.91 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (t2) 2.91 2.65 3.35 3.76 3.04 3.04 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (t3) 2.79 2.84 3.46 4.14 2.99 3.31 
Adult State Hope Scale (t1)
 Ψ
 37.53 6.16 37.94 7.15 37.67 6.47 
Adult State Hope Scale (t2) 38.02 6.35 38.89 7.08 38.30 6.58 
Adult State Hope Scale (t3) 38.53 6.56 38.65 7.59 38.57 6.88 
Herth Hope Scale (t1)
 Ψ*
 70.23 10.00 67.70 11.96 69.46 10.68 
Herth Hope Scale (t2)* 71.40 10.74 68.52 14.17 70.51 11.95 
Herth Hope Scale (t3)* 72.43 11.80 68.58 15.27 71.24 13.06 
Stress (t1)* 18.36 8.27 15.41 8.46 17.46 8.42 
Stress (t2)* 18.41 8.53 14.98 7.49 17.37 8.37 
Stress (t3)* 17.88 8.85 15.54 8.11 17.19 8.71 
Internal Locus of Control (t1) 36.47 4.69 36.30 5.22 36.43 4.85 
Internal Locus of Control (t2) 36.74 4.97 36.14 5.63 36.56 5.18 
Internal Locus of Control (t3) 36.91 5.41 36.50 6.23 36.79 5.67 
Social Desirability (t1)
 Ψ
 3.96 2.16 3.93 2.37 3.95 2.23 
Social Desirability (t2) 3.77 2.37 4.06 2.57 3.87 2.43 
Social Desirability (t3) 3.74 2.47 3.79 2.45 3.76 2.46 
 
Note. 
Ψ 
= Overall mean changed to a statistically significant degree (p < .05) over the course of 
the study; * = Mean levels for women and men differed to a statistically significant degree (p < 
.05); t1 = baseline; t2 = one month; t3 = 2 months; Stress measured with the Undergraduate 
Stress Questionnaire; Internal locus of control measured with Levenson’s Internal scale; Social 
Desirability Measured with Short form A of the Marlowe-Crowne.  
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indicator of another construct than with another measure of meaning suggests that the instrument 
assesses another construct more than it assesses meaning. 
 Pearson correlations in which a meaning measure correlated significantly with social 
desirability, or was more highly correlated with a non-meaning measure than with any of the 
other measures of meaning are bolded in Tables 2, 3, and 4, because such correlations are 
indicative of compromised construct validity in the measure of meaning. Over the three time  
 
Table 2. Concurrent Correlations at Baseline 
Scale PMP SMS LRIF 
Personal Meaning Profile (PMP)  1.00  0.73**  0.61** 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (SMS)  0.73**  1.00  0.54** 
LRI-R-framework (LRIF)  0.61**  0.54**  1.00 
Short form A Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability  0.20**  0.05  0.17* 
Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire  0.02  0.10 -0.04 
DASS-depression  -0.41** -0.31** -0.41** 
PAI-depression  -0.55** -0.42** -0.50** 
Beck Depression Inventory-II -0.39** -0.27** -0.40** 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.55** -0.46** -0.52** 
Adult State Hope Scale   0.63**  0.43**  0.52** 
Herth Hope Scale   0.76**  0.64**  0.62** 
Internal locus of control   0.29**  0.26**  0.27** 
 
Note. * = p < .01; ** = p < .001.  
 
Table 3. Concurrent Correlations after One Month (Time 2) 
Scale PMP SMS LRIF 
Personal Meaning Profile (PMP)  1.00  0.73**  0.64** 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (SMS)  0.73**  1.00  0.52** 
LRI-R-framework (LRIF)  0.64**  0.52**  1.00 
Short form A Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability  0.17*  0.09  0.20** 
Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire -0.06  0.02 -0.15* 
DASS-depression  -0.48** -0.31** -0.44** 
PAI-depression  -0.61** -0.42** -0.54** 
Beck Depression Inventory-II -0.53** -0.35** -0.45** 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.60** -0.51** -0.60** 
Adult State Hope Scale   0.68**  0.46**  0.57** 
Herth Hope Scale   0.79**  0.63**  0.66** 
Internal locus of control   0.37**  0.26**  0.25** 
 
Note. * = p < .01; ** = p < .001. 
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Table 4. Concurrent Correlations after Two Months (Time 3) 
Scale PMP SMS LRIF 
Personal Meaning Profile (PMP)  1.00  0.76**  0.65** 
Spiritual Meaning Scale (SMS)  0.76**  1.00  0.64** 
LRI-R-framework (LRIF)  0.65**  0.64**  1.00 
Short form A Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability  0.20**  0.09  0.20** 
Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire -0.09  0.02 -0.18** 
DASS-depression  -0.56** -0.42** -0.47** 
PAI-depression  -0.64** -0.52** -0.55** 
Beck Depression Inventory-II -0.58** -0.44** -0.51** 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.62** -0.57** -0.60** 
Adult State Hope Scale   0.70**  0.58**  0.65** 
Herth Hope Scale   0.81**  0.70**  0.68** 
Internal locus of control   0.43**  0.32**  0.35** 
 
Note. * = p < .01; ** = p < .001. 
 
periods, the Personal Meaning Profile (PMP) had 9 such undesirable correlations, the framework 
subscale of the Revised Life Regard Index (LRI-R-framework) had 10, and the Spiritual 
Meaning Scale (SMS) had only 3 (all of which were with the Herth Hope Scale). The PMP and 
LRI-R-framework were correlated with social desirability at all three time points. There were 
several instances in which the PMP or LRI-R-framework was more highly correlated with a hope 
measure than with one of the other meaning measures, and all the meaning measures were more 
highly correlated with the Herth Hope Scale (HHS) than with at least one other meaning 
measure. This latter result may speak more to the HHS’s lack of discriminant validity than to 
shortcomings on the part of the meaning measures. However, the meaning measures appear to 
have excellent discriminant validity with regard to depression. There was only one “bad” 
correlation in terms of the depression-meaning relationship, and that was between the LRI-R-
framework and the PAI’s depression scale (PAI-dep) at time 2. Of course, the correlation 
analyses show clearly that meaning has significant relationships with hope and depression, 
highlighting meaning’s clinical relevance. But they also suggest that the SMS is a more pure 
measure of existential meaning than are the PMP or LRI-R-framework, and that the construct of 
 35
meaning is distinct from that of depression but perhaps not from the construct of hope. 
Structural Equation Model of Meaning and Depression 
 To examine the hypothesis that changes in existential meaning and depression  
reciprocally and prospectively predict on one another, AMOS 3.61 (Arbuckle, 1995) was used to 
conduct a latent cross-lagged panel analysis modeling the relationship between meaning and 
depression across 3 time points, each separated by one month. A latent social desirability factor 
was included in the model, and variance in depression and meaning accounted for by social 
desirability was partialed out by including regression lines from the social desirability variable at 
times 2 and 3 to the meaning and depression variables at times 2 and 3.  
 Before exploring the measurement and structural models, the extent to which the 
proposed model fit the data was observed. Indices used to assess model fit were the Normed Fit 
Index (NFI: Bentler & Bonnett, 1980), Comparative Fit Index (CFI: Bentler, 1990), and Root-
Mean-Squared Error of Approximation (RMSEA: Steiger, 1990). For the NFI and CFI, values 
above .95 suggest good fit, whereas RMSEA values of .06 and lower indicate good fit (Byrne, 
2001). For the current model, the NFI, CFI, and RMSEA were .96, .98, and .04, respectively. 
Also speaking to the appropriateness of the current model, the only standardized residuals 
beyond the 2.58 threshold were covariances of  
–
2.85 and 
–
2.67 between the LRI-R-framework at 
time 1 and the PAI-dep at times 1 and 3, respectively (corresponding to the “bad” correlation 
mentioned earlier between the LRI-R-framework and PAI-dep). Further, no modification index 
was greater than 11.5.  
Results for the measurement models are shown in Figure 2, and the structural model is 
displayed in Figure 3. Regarding the measurement models, all loadings on the latent variables 
were statistically significant, that is, at least twice the size of their standard errors. All but four  
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Figure 2. Standardized Measurement Models for Meaning, Depression, and Social Desirability.  
 
 
correlations between error variances across time points were statistically significant, the four 
non-significant values being the correlations between the error variances for the negatively 
worded items on the MCSD and of the error variance for the PMP at time 2 with the PMP at time 
3. Regarding the structural model, the significant, negative value for the diagonal arrow in panel 
2 running from Meaning to Depression, displayed in Figure 3, indicates that decreases in 
meaning over the first month of the study significantly predicted increases in depressive 
symptoms over the second month of the study. None of the other cross-lags were significant, 
suggesting that changes in meaning drive changes in depression, but not vice versa. Thus, 
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Figure 3. Latent Cross-Lagged Panel Model of Meaning and Depression over 2 One-Month 
Time Periods, Controlling for Social Desirability. 
 
although the hypothesis of reciprocal prediction between meaning and depression was not 
supported, the model provides evidence for unidirectional causation in which existential meaning 
has influence on depressive symptoms. There are additional aspects of the structural model 
shown in Figure 3 that are worthy of comment. First, Social Desirability and Meaning are quite 
stable across time, as indicated by the large values for their stability estimates as well as the 
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relatively small values of their disturbances. However, all disturbances except for that of social 
desirability at time 2 were significantly greater than 0 and all correlations and stability estimates 
in the structural model were statistically significant. 
Structural Equation Model of Meaning and Hope 
The same procedure was used to examine the hypothesis that existential meaning and 
hope have reciprocally causal influence on one another as was used to examine meaning’s 
relationship with depression, with the HHS, SHS, and BHS serving as indicators for the latent 
hope variable. Foreshadowed, however, by the correlation analyses suggesting that meaning and 
hope might not be independent constructs, results for the model were inadmissible due to a 
portion of the covariance matrix not being positive definite. The problem was that the indicators 
of meaning and hope overlapped to such a degree that the disturbances in meaning and hope at 
time 2 had a correlation greater than one. The author therefore investigated the difference in fit at 
baseline between two different measurement models of hope and meaning, one in which all the 
meaning and hope measures loaded on a single factor and another in which they loaded on two 
different factors. If allowing the meaning and hope indicators to load on separate factors fit the 
data substantially better than forcing them to load on a single factor, then conceptualizing 
meaning and hope as separate variables would remain plausible. When all measures were forced 
to load on a single factor, the chi square value with 9 degrees of freedom was 53.17, with NFI = 
.96, CFI = .97, and RMSEA = .11. When the meaning measures were allowed to load on a 
meaning factor that was distinct from but correlated with a hope factor on which the hope 
measures loaded, the chi square with 8 degrees of freedom was 42.08, with NFI = .97, CFI = .97, 
and RMSEA = .10. Thus, although the chi square change between the two models was 
significant (p < .01), suggesting that a two-factor model fit the data better than a one-factor 
model, the other fit indices indicated little advantage for creating separate meaning and hope 
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factors. 
The ambiguous results for the above noted model testing are the price paid when 
measures are constructed with too much emphasis on convergent validity and too little on 
discriminant validity. Because of the problems with using all three meaning measures to form a 
latent variable that is distinct from hope, the SMS was selected as the sole representative of 
existential meaning for the analysis of meaning’s relationship with hope, because it was the only 
of the three meaning measures that demonstrated excellent discriminant validity. The SMS was 
then run in three separate cross-lagged panel analyses predicting the three different measures of 
hope. These models were similar in nature to the model for meaning and depression, except that 
social desirability was not included due to the SMS’s not being correlated with social 
desirability. Regarding fit statistics, the NFI was .96 for all three models, the CFI was .96, .96, 
and .97 for the BHS, SHS, and HHS models, respectively, and the RMSEA was .20, .18, and .19 
for the BHS, SHS, and HHS models, respectively. The RMSEA values were thus considerably 
higher than the limit of .07 that indicates deficient model fit. Modification indices implied that 
the model would fit better by accounting for the fact that the disturbances for hope/hopelessness 
at time 2 appeared to have a substantial negative relationship with the disturbances at time 3, and 
the same was true for the disturbances in spiritual meaning. However, correlations between 
disturbances at different time points were not freed to be estimated in the original models 
because doing so does not make sense theoretically. What the odd correlations between the 
disturbances suggest is that many of those whose levels of spiritual meaning and hope changed 
during the first month of the study experienced a similar change in the opposite direction (i.e. a 
return to original levels) during second month of the study. There was consequently a substantial 
portion of variance in spiritual meaning and hope at time 3 that could not be explained by time 2 
levels of these variables but could be accounted for by baseline levels. To represent this fact, 
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hope/hopelessness at baseline was freed to predict hope/hopelessness at time 3 directly (not just 
through time 2 hope/hopelessness), and the same was done for spiritual meaning. Making this 
change, which makes substantive sense, improved the model fit tremendously. With the above 
noted modifications, the NFI and CFI were greater than .99 for all three models, and the RMSEA 
was .04, 0, and 0 for the BHS, SHS, and HHS models, respectively.  
Results of the modified path analyses for spiritual meaning’s relationship with the BHS, 
SHS, and HHS are depicted in Figure 4. Note that because a regression path was entered directly 
from each variable at baseline to that variable at time 3, the path from each variable at time 2 to 
that variable at time 3 is not a test-retest reliability or stability coefficient. Paths from variables at 
baseline to those variables at time 2 are stability coefficients, whereas paths from time 2 to 3 
represent the portion of a time 3 variable that is not predicted by that variable at baseline but is 
predicted by that variable at time 2. This ensures that all paths from time 2 to time 3 (including 
cross-lags) are not merely predicting people’s returning to baseline levels at the end of the study 
after having deviated from those levels during the first month of the study.  
Figure 4 illustrates the reciprocal relationship between spiritual meaning and 
hope/hopelessness. As indicated by the significant cross-lags in the second panel from the SMS 
to SHS and HHS, changes in spiritual meaning over the first month of the study predicted 
changes in both measures of hope over the subsequent month. Likewise, changes in each of the 
hope measures over the first month predicted changes in spiritual meaning over the second 
month. The non-significant lag from spiritual meaning at time 2 to the BHS at time 3 indicates 
that changes in spiritual meaning did not significantly predict subsequent changes in 
hopelessness. However, like in the SHS and HHS models, the beta for the lag from spiritual 
meaning at baseline to the BHS at time 2 was significant, as was the lag from BHS at time 2 to 
spiritual meaning at time 3. This suggests that that those with low levels of spiritual meaning are  
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Figure 4. Three Cross-Lagged Panel Analyses of Spiritual Meaning (sms) and the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (bhs), Adult State Hope Scale (shs), and Herth Hope Scale (hhs), 
respectively, over 2 One-Month Time Periods. All values are statistically significant (p < .05) 
except those labeled ns. 
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vulnerable to increased hopelessness, with such increases in hopelessness leading to 
subsequently decreased levels of spiritual meaning. 
Interaction between Meaning and Stress 
 Structural equation modeling provided evidence that changes in meaning precede 
proportional changes in depressive symptoms, and that changes in spiritual meaning precede 
proportional changes in the experience of hope, with meaning likely having causal influence on 
hope and depression. The question remained as to meaning’s ability to serve as a resiliency 
variable or stress buffer. Regression analysis was used to test the extent to which meaning as 
assessed by a composite of z-score transformed scores from the PMP, SMS, and LRI-R-
framework interacts with stress to prospectively predict depressive symptoms as measured by a 
composite of z-score transformed scores from the BDI-II, PAI-dep, and DASS-dep, and whether 
the SMS interacts with stress to prospectively predict hope as measured by the HHS, SHS, and 
BHS. It was predicted that the interaction of baseline meaning levels with residual change in 
stress over the course of the study would predict residual change in depression and hope over the 
course of the study beyond baseline stress, baseline meaning, and residual change in stress. The 
interaction was predicted to moderate the positive relationship between residual change in stress 
and residual change in depression and the inverse relationship between residual change in stress 
and residual change in hope, such that as meaning levels at baseline increased, stress’ 
relationships with hope and depression would decrease. 
 One regression analysis was performed for the meaning composite in interaction with 
residual change in stress predicting the depression composite at the study’s end, and three 
analyses were performed for the SMS in interaction with residual change in stress respectively 
predicting the three measures of hope at the study’s end. For step one of each of these analyses, 
levels of the respective meaning variable at baseline, the respective outcome variable at baseline,  
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Table 5. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Meaning x Residual Stress-Change Predicting 
Two-Month Depression Levels, Controlling for Baseline Depression, Social Desirability, and 
Stress 
Step Baseline 
Depression 
β (b) 
Baseline 
Stress 
β (b) 
Baseline Social 
Desirability  
β (b) 
Stress 
Change  
β (b) 
Baseline 
Meaning  
β (b) 
Meaning x 
Stress-
Change  
β (b) 
R
2
 
1 .54 (.57)** .04 (.01) .03 (.04) .21 (.09)** -.16 (-.17)** -- .48 
2 .55 (.57)** .03 (.01) .02 (.03) .21 (.09)** -.16 (-.17)** -.09 (-.02)* .49 
 
Note. * = p < .05; ** = p < .001; Social Desirability measured with Short Form A of the 
Marlowe-Crowne; Stress measured with the Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire; Meaning 
measured with a composite of z-score transformed scores from the Personal Meaning Profile, 
Spiritual Meaning Scale, and the framework sub-scale of the Revised Life Regard Index; 
Depression measured with a composite of z-score transformed scores from the depression scale 
of the Personality Assessment Inventory, the depression scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales, and the Beck Depression Inventory-II. 
 
 
stress at baseline, and residual change in stress over the course of the study were entered. For 
step two of each regression, the interaction between the respective meaning variable and residual 
change in stress was added. For the analysis using the meaning composite, social desirability at 
baseline was also entered in step one due to the PMP’s and LRI-R-Framework’s correlation with 
social desirability. Results for the analysis predicting depression are summarized in Table 5, and 
they indicate that the interaction between meaning and residual stress-change did predict a small 
but statistically significant amount of variance in residual change in depression such that 
increased amounts of meaning at baseline were linked to a significant decrease in the 
relationship between change in stress and change in depression. This interaction is illustrated in 
Figure 5.  
 Regarding the 3 regression analyses predicting the 3 hope variables, the SMS’s 
interaction with stress predicted a miniscule but statistically significant amount of variance in 
residual change for the SHS (R
2
 change = .007, p = .04), it was a marginally significant predictor 
of variance in residual change for the HHS (R
2
 change = .004, p = .05), and it did not predict 
significant amounts of variance in residual change for the BHS (R
2
 change = 0, ns). Seeing  
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Figure 5. Interaction between Meaning and Residual Change in Stress Predicting Two-Month 
Depression Levels, Controlling for Baseline Depression, Stress, and Social Desirability. 
 
 
as how there was no effect for the BHS, while the effects for the HHS and the SHS were 
small as well as in opposite directions, results suggest that spiritual meaning has no 
interaction with stress in predicting hope. 
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Supplemental Analyses  
 
Interaction between Meaning and Locus of Control. The author examined the extent to 
which the personality variable of internal locus of control had moderating effects on spiritual 
meaning’s relationships with hope and depression that were different than any moderating 
effects it had on personal meaning. It was supposed that because spiritual meaning involves self-  
transcendent factors, whereas personal meaning is more concerned with the individual self, 
spiritual meaning’s link to mental health might be enhanced for individuals with lower internal 
locus of control while personal meaning’s might be enhanced for those with higher internal locus 
of control. Regression analysis was used to test this supposition, with analyses testing the SMS’s 
and LRI-R-framework’s interaction with Levenson’s (1974) Internal scale in predicting changes 
in depression and hope over the course of the study. For each analysis, baseline levels of the 
respective meaning variable, internal locus of control, and social desirability were entered in step 
1, and the interaction between the meaning variable and internal locus of control was entered in 
step 2.  
Analyses indicated that spiritual meaning did not have an interaction with internal locus 
of control in predicting either depression or hope (R
2
 = .001, ns and R
2
 = .002, ns, respectively). 
Personal meaning did not interact with internal locus of control in predicting hope (R
2
 = .002, ns) 
but there was an interaction predicting depression. Results of the analysis of internal locus of 
control and personal meaning predicting depression are summarized in Table 6, and the 
interaction is actually in the opposite of the predicted direction. That is, as levels of internal 
locus of control increased, the relationship between personal meaning and depression became 
weaker rather than stronger.  
Behavioral High-Risk Design. The slew of regression analyses employed in the current 
study in combination with the rather complex structural equation modeling could leave one with  
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Table 6. Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Personal Meaning x Internal Locus of Control 
Predicting Two-Month Depression Levels, Controlling for Baseline Depression and Social 
Desirability 
Step Baseline Social 
Desirability 
β (b) 
Baseline 
Depression 
β (b) 
Baseline LRI-
R-framework  
β (b) 
Baseline Internal 
Locus of Control 
β (b) 
Personal Meaning 
x Internal Locus 
of Control β (b) 
R
2
 
1 .03 (.03) .58 (.61)*** -.10 (-.05)* -.09(-.05)* -- .43 
2 .02 (.02) .57 (.60)*** -.84 (-.44)** -.71(-.41)** 1.09 (.01)** .44 
 
Note. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001; Social Desirability measured with Short Form A 
of the Marlowe-Crowne; Internal Locus of Control measured with Levenson’s Internal scale; 
Personal Meaning measured with the revised framework subscale of the Life Regard Index; 
Depression measured with a composite of the depression scale of the Personality Assessment 
Inventory, the depression scale of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales, and the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II. 
 
 
an overly abstract and mathematical feel for the relationship between existential meaning and 
mental health. To summarize the current data on a more concrete level nearer to the clinical 
bottom line, a behavioral high-risk design was employed using the BDI-II and the BHS as 
outcome measures. Two steps were involved in this analysis. First, for all individuals at baseline 
who were below the cutoff score of 14 on the BDI-II that is indicative of mild depression (Beck 
et al., 1996) and below a BHS score of 9, which was found in an outpatient clinical population to 
indicate an 1,100% increased risk of committing suicide (Beck et al., 1990), individuals were 
classified as being high or low in meaning as determined by their being above or below that 
sample’s mean composite meaning score. In the final step of the behavioral high-risk design, the 
percentage of people who had become depressed (as indicated by BDI-II scores at or above 14) 
and hopeless (as indicated by BHS scores at or above 9) by the end of the study was observed for 
those with high compared to those with low levels of meaning. 
Of the initially non-depressed and non-hopeless sample of 309, 135 individuals had a 
low level of meaning and 174 had a high level. By the end of the study two months later, 5 
individuals, all of whom were in the low meaning group at time one, reached levels on the BDI-
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II that indicated at least mild depression as well as levels on the BHS that indicated concerning 
levels of hopelessness. Therefore, 3.7% of the individuals in the low meaning group became 
hopeless and depressed, compared to 1.6% in the overall sample and 0% in the high meaning 
group. This means that non-depressed, non-hopeless individuals with lower than average levels 
of existential meaning at the beginning of the study had a much greater risk of becoming 
hopeless and depressed by the study’s end than individuals with greater than average levels of 
existential meaning and more than a two fold increased risk compared to the overall sample. If 
the same mean-split procedure is conducted for the BDI-II or BHS at baseline as was conducted 
for the meaning composite, then 2 (1.4%) individuals in the 141-member high depression group 
reached clinical levels of both hopelessness and depression by the study’s end versus 3 (1.8%) 
individuals in the 168-member low depression group. Similarly, 2 (1.6%) individuals in the 124-
member high hopelessness group reached clinical levels of hopelessness and depression by the 
study’s end versus 3 (1.6%) individuals in the 185-member low hopelessness group. According 
to this risk analysis, meaning was a better prospective predictor of hopeless depression than 
either hopelessness or depression. 
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CONCLUSION 
Construct Validity of Measures of Existential Meaning 
 The moderate to large correlations that the PMP, LRI-R-framework, and SMS 
demonstrated with one another add support to their convergent validity, and the fact that their 
correlations with social desirability were small indicates some degree of discriminant validity. 
However, the fact that the PMP and LRI-R-framework did have statistically significant 
correlations with social desirability in combination with the fact that they exhibited several 
correlations with measures of hope that were larger than their correlation with at least one other 
measure of meaning are indicative of compromised construct validity on the part of the PMP and 
LRI-R-framework. On the other hand, the SMS had no significant correlations with social 
desirability, and it correlated with just a single hope measure (the HHS) more highly than with at 
least one other meaning measure—with this latter outcome probably being due to the HHS’s 
own lack of discriminant validity rather than that of the SMS.  
The structural equation modeling of meaning, depression, and hope is also informative 
about the construct validity of the three meaning measures. For the model of meaning and 
depression, all three meaning indicators had high loadings across three time points on the latent 
meaning variable. And in keeping with the notion that meaning is a personality variable, the 
meaning factor was relatively stable across time. However, consistent with the results of the 
correlation analyses, the latent meaning variable overlapped so much with hope as assessed with 
the HHS, BHS, and SHS, that the model of meaning and hope was inadmissable. One 
interpretation of such results is that meaning is a construct relatively independent of depression 
but not hope, and it is perhaps even a necessary component of hope (i.e. One needs an 
overarching aim before one has a sense of hope about achieving that aim). Another interpretation 
is that the PMP and LRI-R-framework lack discriminant validity and ought to be revised. The 
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most likely interpretation is that both of the aforementioned have some degree of truth: A sense 
of meaning is perhaps necessary for having a sense of hope, but the PMP and LRI-R-framework 
might become more interpretable if some of the content they contain was brought closer to the 
core of the constructs they purport to measure.  
Meaning’s Role in the Etiology of Depressive Symptoms and Hopelessness 
 Meaning as a Mediator of Change in Hope and Depressive Symptoms. It was 
demonstrated through structural equation modeling that, controlling for any influence of 
depressive symptoms on meaning, changes in meaning over a month’s time are linked to 
inversely proportional changes in depressive symptoms over the subsequent month. It was 
additionally demonstrated that, controlling for any influence of hope on spiritual meaning, 
changes in spiritual meaning over a month’s time are linked to subsequently proportional 
changes in hope, but not hopelessness. Despite the fact that change in spiritual meaning did not 
predict change in hopelessness, low levels of spiritual meaning did serve as a vulnerability for 
increased hopelessness. Unlike meaning’s unidirectional relationship with depression, the 
relationship of spiritual meaning with hope and hopelessness appears to be one of reciprocal 
determination, as increased hopelessness and decreased hope led to decreased levels of spiritual 
meaning. Although there was no manipulation of meaning in the study and therefore no 
possibility for a perfect demonstration of causation, such results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that a decreased sense of existential meaning is related causally to increased 
symptoms of depression and decreased hope.  
Because of the causal implications of the current findings, it is important to understand 
what is meant by meaning in the present study. For the analysis of meaning and depression, the 
existential meaning variable was constituted by 3 meaning subtypes: personal, spiritual, and 
implicit meaning, which are respectively a sense of coherence and purpose about one’s 
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individual life, belief that a self-transcendent/spiritual force has purpose from which one may 
derive personal meaning, and exhibition of particular behaviors and attitudes that are 
normatively viewed by others as indicative of a meaningful life. For present purposes, to be high 
in meaning was to be high on all three of these subtypes and to be low was to be low on all three. 
The current findings indicate that where the three subconstructs converge is indeed important, 
and past research (Mascaro & Rosen, 2005) suggests that where meaning subconstructs converge 
may be more relevant to clinical concerns than where they are distinct. The bottom line is that to 
take a hit to one’s belief in a spiritual purpose that pervades life, to experience confusion about 
the direction and purpose of one’s own life, and to decrease one’s engagement in the experiences 
thought to lead to a meaningful life will likely lead to increased symptoms of depression. Such 
symptoms should not be deemed trivial or dismissed as a mere “existential depression.” Results 
of the behavioral high-risk design suggest that the quality of depression to which decreased 
levels of meaning makes one vulnerable can be in the clinical range and can include an 
alarmingly severe degree of hopelessness. Implications of the relatively direct relationship found 
between meaning and depressive symptoms for the treatment of depression are discussed below. 
Conclusions about meaning’s mediation of change in levels of hope are confined to the 
subtype of spiritual meaning, as the other 2 meaning subtypes were too confounded with hope to 
allow for interpretable analysis. Spiritual meaning, a sense that life is pervaded by a transcendent 
force in which one may participate, and three different forms of hope appear to exhibit reciprocal 
determination of one another. The picture that emerges is this. As people experience decreases in 
their sense of participation in something transcendent, they are likely to become more hopeless 
about achieving their long- and short-term goals. Similarly, as they become more hopeless about 
achieving their long- or short-term goals, they are likely to experience a decrease in the sense 
that they are participating in something transcendent. This relationship is phenomenally 
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important, because insofar as meaning (in the current study) and hope (Whisman & Kwon, 1993; 
Kwon, 2000) are clearly linked to depression, their reciprocal relationship highlights either a 
downward spiral into despair or an ever accelerating ascent up the mount of well-being. 
 Meaning as a Moderator of the Deleterious Effects of Stress. Data from the current study 
suggest that changes in one’s sense of existential meaning induce changes in depressive 
symptoms and hope. They also suggest that a sense of existential meaning can moderate the 
relationship between increased stress and increased depressive symptoms. That is to say, while a 
loss of meaning appears to trigger depressive phenomena, the steady maintenance of meaning 
provides some protection or resiliency against increased depression in response to stress. 
Although this moderation effect is small, Figure 5 shows clearly that depressive symptoms will 
be more reactive to stress if individuals have a low sense of existential meaning than if they have 
a greater sense of meaning. And if we combine the increased reactivity of their depressive 
symptoms to stress with the fact that individuals with a deficient sense of meaning are already 
more depressed than those without such a deficit, then the significance of even a small 
interaction with stress becomes clinically important. 
Unlike the findings for meaning and depression, spiritual meaning did not interact with 
stress in predicting hope. This may be accounted for by the decreased level of stress-reactivity in 
hope relative to depression and perhaps by the equivalent natures of hope and meaning. Consider 
first the fact that the correlations between the hope measures and stress across all three time 
points ranged in absolute value from .02 to .18, whereas the correlations between the depression 
measures and stress ranged from absolute values of .28 to .39. The less reactive hope is to stress, 
the less of a relationship there is for meaning to moderate. Consider also that meaning and hope 
both appear to be variables that are future looking. Meaning involves the thought, “In what 
direction shall I head?” Hope involves the thought, “Can I really head in the direction I wish to 
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head?” And as mentioned earlier, part of the concept of existential meaning (viz. having a 
framework for living that leads to the pursuit of specific goals or ends) might be necessary for 
having hope. The two constructs are so similar by definition (and empirically, as shown in this 
study) that hope very likely plays the same moderator role as does meaning, and is therefore not 
likely to be a reactive variable whose relationship with stress will be moderated. 
Study Limitations and Implications 
 Limitations. Looking to the future, the current study contains weaknesses that require 
correcting and highlights areas for clinically useful research. Regarding weaknesses, the 
overwhelmingly Protestant Christian and white nature of the study’s sample is not adequately 
representative of the United States’ heterogeneous population. Similar investigations as the 
present one should therefore be conducted within populations with more cultural heterogeneity. 
Second, seeing as how the primary issue in the current study was existential meaning’s causal 
influence on depressive phenomena, the fact that there was no experimental manipulation of 
meaning is a methodological shortcoming. Certainly there are ethical problems with attempting 
to induce a state of meaninglessness in subjects to the end of increasing their depression levels, 
and this is why the counterpart strategy of outcome research is warranted. That is, the gold 
standard for assessing meaning’s causal influence upon depression would be to compare a 
meaning-focused treatment for depression with alternative treatments, and analyzing not just the 
extent to which the meaning-focused treatment influences depression, but also the extent to 
which changes in meaning within the meaning-focused treatment mediate changes in depression.  
A final issue regarding study limitations involves the PMP’s and LRI-R-framework’s 
deficient discriminant validity, as demonstrated by their correlations with social desirability and 
the frequency with which they were correlated with measures of hope to a greater extent than 
they were correlated with other meaning measures. Now the PMP and the construct it measures 
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are by their nature heterogeneous and consequently should correlate with a broader array of 
constructs than the more homogeneous constructs of spiritual and personal meaning. However, a 
device purporting to measure meaning predominantly ought to have stronger relationships with 
other meaning measures than with variables that are by definition more peripheral to the 
assessment of meaning. Particularly if they are not being employed in combination with other 
meaning measures to form a latent or composite variable, then the PMP and LRI-R-framework 
should have their content modified, with items being isolated that are most central to the 
construct of meaning. This would increase the likelihood that any significant effects found while 
using these measures would be due to meaning rather than to extraneous variables. The author 
endorses modifying the LRI-R-framework and PMP in this way and using them in combination 
with the more recently developed and already adequately specific SMS, which can be found in 
the Appendix. 
 Implications. The current findings point in directions beyond merely correcting the 
study’s weaknesses. The three measurement devices used in the present research could be useful 
in examining the mechanisms by which meaning impacts mental health. For instance, the 
experience of existential meaning seems to bring with it two primary features, an affectively 
charged sense of striving towards highly valued (often spiritual) ends, as well as a coherent 
framework that structures this striving. It is the combination of structure and striving that the 
author believes can lead to changes in depressive symptomatology and provide resiliency against 
decompensation when faced with stress. A worthwhile investigation might involve determining 
how well measures of meaning can predict behaviors marked by a lack of structure (e.g., 
excessive levels of disorganized activity a la mania or Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder) 
or a lack of striving (e.g., affective symptoms of depression) relative to other clinical 
phenomena. 
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Results of the current study point to specific ways in which the topic of existential 
meaning might be addressed in psychotherapy for depressive disorders. The fact that meaning 
appears to have direct influence on depression and hope favors evaluating meaning early in 
therapy, as if it played a proximally causal role in the distress that brings individuals to 
treatment. Particularly if meaning-related assessment devices indicate that patients have levels of 
existential meaning significantly below the norm, then a clinician should not be averse to asking 
patients about their views on the meaning of life, the purpose of their own life, and the areas 
from which they discover meaning. The PMP could prove especially useful in this latter regard 
because it could indicate if a patient is hypo-engaged in any of the areas from which individuals 
tend to find meaning. To the author’s knowledge, standardized meaning-related assessment has 
not been attempted within such a clinical context.  
Also worth considering are the present study’s findings regarding meaning’s role as a 
stress buffer. These suggest that psychotherapists could foster resiliency in their patients by 
helping them explore ways of maintaining a sense of existential meaning. Now the topic of 
maintaining meaning might induce one to ask how meaning is enhanced in the first place. It has 
been presumed before (Yalom, 1980) that meaning can be elusive when it is sought with too 
much conscious vigor and Western resolve. The assumption is that sitting in a dark room asking 
oneself over and over again, “What does it all mean?” might not be as fruitful as developing 
mindfulness skills that allow the psyche to become open to the meanings emerging from even 
the simplest activity. This assumption is consistent with principles underlying extant 
interpersonal (Cashdan, 1982) and behavioral (Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001) treatments 
for depression. For instance, people often report meaning as arising from experiences of 
interpersonal intimacy and connectedness (Ali & Toner, 2001; Ali, Oatley, & Toner, 2002; 
Debats et al., 1995; Moore, 1997; Debats, 1999), and the fact that 2 of the PMP’s 7 subscales 
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(relationship and intimacy) are interpersonal in nature provides convergent support for this 
notion.  
The other 5 areas assessed by the PMP (i.e. achievement, religion, self-transcendence, 
self-acceptance, and fair treatment) may also lead to an enhanced sense of meaning. Overlapping 
these categories of implicit meaning, Baum and Stewart (1990) found that individuals commonly 
report work, love and marriage, childbirth, and engagement in independent, avocational 
activities as leading to a sense of meaning in life, with the last category highlighting the potential 
relevance of creativity and play to a sense of existential meaning. Similarly, Ali and Toner 
(2001) and Ali et al. (2002) found some dominant sources of meaning in women to be 
spirituality, career concerns, romantic relationships, friendship relationships, and familial 
relationships, with Ali et al. (2002) finding additional categories of physical exercise and 
creative (artistic) expression. Finally, in Heiland et al.’s (2002) study of HIV positive patients, 
the categories of career, self-indulgence, spirituality, romantic partners, family and friends, 
helping others, and leisure (avocational) activities emerged as common sources of meaning. A 
cursory analysis of such qualitative studies yields several sources of meaning that are common to 
multiple populations. These include spirituality or religiosity; interpersonal relations such as 
friendships, romantic relationships, and familial relationships; altruism or self-transcendence; 
career or achievement related activities; and avocational or artistic activities. The current finding 
that hope may influence spiritual meaning suggests that meaning could be enhanced through the 
establishment of valued, concrete, and achievable goals within the aforementioned domains. 
Needless to say, clinical service would be informed greatly by research exploring how these 
domains of behavior and experience can be reinforced and processed to the end of fostering a 
robust sense of personal and spiritual meaning. 
Offering more in-depth insight into the loss and recovery of meaning is the social-
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cognitive area of theory and research. For instance, Baumeister (1991) posits 4 general needs, 
including purpose, value, self-efficacy, and self-worth, that are singly necessary and jointly 
sufficient for a sense of existential meaning. Presumably, a meaningful view of the world is one 
resulting in the generation of achievable goals that are perceived as valuable or just, a sense that 
there is influence on or control over important life events, and the belief that the individual is a 
basically good and worthwhile person. As one develops or loses a view of self and world that 
satisfies these four needs, meaning will be enhanced or lost, respectively. It is also useful to 
consult theory and research on the way cognitive schemata comprising people’s systems of 
meaning accommodate themselves to and assimilate life events (Epstein, 1994; Park & Folkman, 
1997; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). It appears that meaning-related schemata maintain 
coherence and purpose by providing answers to fundamental questions (i.e. by generating 
attributions) about important life events. These questions are related to how the event happened, 
why it happened to the person to whom it happened, how the event could be controlled or 
influenced, to what end the event occurred, and what can be gleaned from the event for 
optimizing the individual’s (perhaps revised) purpose in life. If a meaning schema does not 
provide answers to such questions when un-ignorable, negative life events occur (i.e. when a 
meaning system cannot assimilate an event), the event is experienced as traumatic and is 
ruminated upon (or even re-experienced) until the system accommodates it. Such factors imply 
that, when traumatic events occur that disconfirm integral assumptions within a person’s 
meaning framework, recovery of meaning in the form of a more mature and flexible framework 
might be obtained by processing the negative event in terms of the factors that led to its 
occurrence, why it occurred to the person to whom it occurred, what might be done to control 
similar future events, why it may have occurred in a teleological sense, and what can be taken 
from it and used as material for the pursuit and attainment of valued life goals. Baumeister 
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(1991) discusses the less acute version of such a process, in which multiple factors that are 
dissonant with a particular system of meaning accumulate over time in a process called 
crystallization of discontent. This process leads to abandonment of the increasingly insufficient 
system of meaning, often followed by a meaning vacuum. The recovery of meaning occurs 
through exploration of alternative ways for generating purpose, value, self-efficacy, and self-
worth. 
The topic of influencing meaning leads to questions about which psychotherapeutic 
approaches are most suitable to the treatment of meaninglessness. To the author’s mind, a 
therapist can facilitate meaning from cognitive, behavioral, dynamic, or humanistic/emotion-
focused perspectives. A cognitive approach would be more likely to focus on distortions and 
attributions that block a patient’s attainment of a sense of meaning, and it would rely on creative 
thinking regarding how a patient already has or might discover a purpose that harmonizes with 
some greater societal or transpersonal aim. Of course, the processing of traumatic or meaning 
discrepant events that was discussed above is clearly a cognitive sort of intervention. A more 
behavioral approach might involve the development of mindfulness skills, which have already 
been shown useful in the treatment of a variety of psychopathologies (Baer, 2003). Such skills 
open a patient’s mind to the intrinsic rewards (or positive reinforcement value) in simple 
behaviors, and they can be used in combination with behavioral engagement in the experiences 
cited earlier as common sources of meaning (e.g., interpersonal relationships, altruistic activities, 
creative endeavors, career-related activities, or spiritual pursuits). A psychodynamic therapist 
like Yalom would be more likely to point out a patient’s avoidance of the issue of existential 
meaning, and the manifestation of this avoidance in things like guilt about “not doing anything 
with my life”, self-destructive and often drug-abusing engagement in the hedonistic life, and a 
general running away from the hard work entailed by the pursuit of any heart-felt purpose. A 
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humanistic and emotion-focused approach to meaning—imagine a combination of Carl Rogers, 
Leslie Greenberg, and Viktor Frankl—would revolve around the notion that emotionally intimate 
relationships appear to drive a sense of existential meaning. To the extent that a patient is 
informed on a concrete and emotional level through congruent interaction with the therapist that 
her primary emotions are valid and worthwhile, she can begin to use those primary emotions to 
develop a framework of pursuits that reflects her true purpose in life. An integrated approach, 
preferred by the author, relies on constant employment of humanistic/emotion-focused methods 
aimed at uncovering and validating primary emotions that are the wellspring of meaning, a 
combination of interpreting patients’ avoidance of the responsibility for discovering their 
purpose in life and challenging any biases they have regarding life’s potential for meaning, while 
following a sequence from mindfulness skills training to mindful engagement in simple (yet self-
transcendent and non-self-focused) behaviors hypothesized to lead to an enhanced sense of 
meaning in life. The present discussion of meaning-focused therapy should make clear that the 
construct of existential meaning is not so ethereal as to evade the sort of conceptualization that 
lends itself to empirical analysis and widespread clinical application. 
Findings of the present study indicate not only that a variable as uniquely human and 
spiritual as existential meaning can be assessed empirically, but it can also inform the 
conceptualization and treatment of depression. And the discussion above makes clear that a 
meaning-informed approach to psychotherapy can be conceptualized in a straightforward manner 
that is abundantly suitable for outcome research. The author encourages clinical researchers to 
develop ways of using the three meaning instruments utilized in the current study for assessment 
within clinical practice, to continue to explore the mechanisms influencing existential variables 
and the mechanisms by which existential variables influence mental health, and to increase 
research and reliance on meaning-focused interventions for problems such as hopelessness and 
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depression. 
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APPENDIX 
SMS
1
 
 
 
 
 
  1. There is no particular reason why I exist. 
  2. We are each meant to make our own special contribution to the world. 
  3. I was meant to actualize my potentials. 
  4. Life is inherently meaningful. 
  5. I will never have a spiritual bond with anyone. 
  6. When I look deep within my heart, I see a life I am compelled to pursue. 
  7. My life is meaningful. 
  8. In performing certain tasks, I can feel something higher or transcendent working 
      through me. 
  9. Our flawed and often horrific behavior indicates that there is little or no meaning 
      inherent in our existence. 
  10. I find meaning even in my mistakes and sins. 
  11. I see a special purpose for myself in this world. 
  12. There are certain activities, jobs, or services to which I feel called. 
  13. There is no reason or meaning underlying human existence. 
  14. Something purposeful is at the heart of this world. 
  15. We are all participating in something larger and greater than any of us. 
                                                 
1
 Items 1, 5, 9, and 13 are reverse scored. 
1 2     3      4        5 
I totally disagree     I partially disagree   I’m in between     I partially agree     I totally agree 
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